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INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss the operation of two portions of the Uniform
Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) on mortgage foreclosure law.1 Article 3 of the
U.C.C. governs negotiable instruments, whereas Article 9 governs secured
transactions. For decades, courts have utilized Article 3 to determine the
rights of lenders and their assigns to enforce mortgage promissory notes and
to foreclose mortgages thereon. However, certain jurisdictions do not utilize
the U.C.C. in foreclosure cases, whereas other jurisdictions have recently

*

Mr. Weinstein is a Senior Attorney at Van Ness Law Firm, PLC, in Miami, Florida. He
received his law degree from the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida and his
undergraduate degree from the University of Florida.
1
The interplay between state law and the U.C.C. is important in the context of mortgage
foreclosures, because foreclosures are governed by local real property laws, but are variously
contextualized by state versions of the Code. Am. Law Inst., Report of the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code: Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to
Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes 1 (2011).
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begun to look to Article 9 instead.2 This article argues that the Uniform
Commercial Code should receive more uniform application, with Article 3 as
the enforcement tool of the land.
It can hardly be overstated that the current backlog of foreclosure cases is
and has been stalling the housing recovery, causing ripple effects throughout
the economy.3 In general, states operate within one or two superstructures,
so far as the foreclosure process is concerned. Foreclosure of a mortgage can
either be a judicial process or a non-judicial process, and roughly half of the
states operate in each of these frameworks.4 The process of judicial
foreclosure is a costly and lengthy means to effectuate a foreclosure sale.5
While there is little uniformity between states in terms of foreclosure laws,
the law of negotiable instruments exists in forty-nine states, and presents
potentially uniform rules aiding the prosecution of plaintiffs’ attempts to
enforce notes and foreclose mortgages.6
An extended and uncertain foreclosure system causes various problems.
Lengthening the foreclosure process may cause opportunistic borrowers to
become more likely to engage in strategic default, which creates a cycle of
foreclosures by furthering the backlog of foreclosure cases, thus increasing
the time to resolve any given foreclosure case, further emboldening would-be
strategic defaulters.7 Moreover, lengthy foreclosure processes increase the
likelihood that a code violation will occur or that an absentee owner may take
tenants’ rent payments without dutifully meeting the burden of investing in

2

See generally Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the
U.C.C., 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1205, 1241–50 (2013).
3
Helen Mason, No One Saw It Coming – Again Systemic Risk and State Foreclosure
Proceedings: Why a National Uniform Foreclosure Law is Necessary, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV.
41, 47–49 (2012) (indicating that clearing foreclosure inefficiencies would aid the housing
recovery). As of 2012, “[h]istorically high levels of mortgage defaults continue to overwhelm
the foreclosure system.” Alan M. White, Losing the Paper – Mortgage Assignments, Note
Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 469 (2012). Although
the number of properties with foreclosure filings fell to 1,117,426 in 2014, that amount is still
approximately 156% of the number of filings during 2006. See 1.1 Million U.S. Properties
with Foreclosure Filings in 2014, Down 18 Percent from 2013 to Lowest Level Since 2006,
REALTYTRAC (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-marketreport/11-million-us-properties-with-foreclosure-filings-in-2014-down-18-percent-from-2013to-lowest-level-since-2006-8205. Additionally, “a recent surge in foreclosure starts and
scheduled foreclosure auctions in several states in the last few months of 2014 indicate that
lenders are gearing up for a spring cleaning of deferred distress in the first half of 2015 in
some local markets.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
4
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. § 3.4 (1997).
5
Mason, supra note 3, at 47–49.
6
Id. at 53.
7
Id. at 69–70. This problem also carries with it the risk that lenders will be less willing to
engage in workout options with individuals who are acting in good faith.
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building upkeep.8 These problems combine to slow or prevent a full
recovery from occurring.
As will be discussed, infra, the concept of “negotiability,” namely that
parties should be able to affect the transfer of certain instruments by a
transfer of possession, provides a predictable and largely complete
framework for determining a party’s right to enforce an instrument such as a
promissory note.9 Negotiable notes are involved in many judicial foreclosure
proceedings, and the negotiability of such notes facilitates the determination
of the parties’ rights.
Some states and courts do not use the U.C.C. in determining who is
entitled to enforce a mortgage note.10 In other states, there have been recent
attempts to forego determining who is entitled to enforce a note by way of its
negotiability and to, instead, apply portions of the U.C.C. that deal with
secured transactions.11 These changes largely began after the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the “National
Conference”) adopted amendments to Article 9 of the U.C.C., initially for the
purpose of facilitating the securitization of mortgages.12 Recently, in HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez,13 a court determined the priority of two would-be
possessors of fraudulent notes and mortgages for the same property by
looking to the State’s codification of Article 9.14 It is against this backdrop
that the history and future of mortgage note negotiability should be
discussed.
Parts I-III of this Article will discuss the negotiable nature of mortgage
notes, and the significance of this character. Part I will briefly discuss the
importance of a plaintiff’s standing to initiate and pursue foreclosure. Part II
8

Steven T. Hasty, Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure by Funding Needed Repairs, 20 J. L. &
POL’Y 581, 594 (2012).
9
Report of the Editorial Board, supra note 1, at 4. The “complete set of rules” provided in
Article 3 is generally only contingent upon the instrument overcoming one entry barrier to
enforcement: “If the mortgage note is a negotiable instrument” then Article 3 will be able to
help parties and the courts determine who may enforce obligations and to whom obligations
are owed. Id.
10
See Renuart, supra note 2, at 1249–50.
11
See generally Thomas Erskine Ice, Negotiating the American Dream: A Critical Look at the
Role of Negotiability in the Foreclosure Crisis, 86 FLA. B.J. 8 (Dec. 2012); Matthew D.
Weidner & Michael Fulchino, Foreclosing in a Hurricane: Florida Courts Struggle to Deal
with a Crisis of Epic Proportions, 41 STETSON L. REV. 679 (2012); White, supra note 3, at
473.
12
Renuart, supra note 2, at 1206 (stating that easing securitization protocols was a “driving
force” in the subject amendments to the U.C.C. and noting that the amendments extend
coverage to the sale of promissory notes, declare that the sale of a note constitutes a sale of the
mortgage, and provide for automatic perfection of “interests in both the note and the
accompanying mortgage without the need to file”).
13
165 So. 3d 696 (Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 2015).
14
As will be discussed, infra, the court in Perez relies upon a case, which utilized Article 3 to
determine a similar situation, and does not explain its reason for deviating from reasoning
under Article 3.
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will analyze the history of both the negotiability of notes and the foreclosure
of mortgages. This historical analysis is meant to provide an explication of
the divergent paths notes and mortgages have taken, in terms of the
predictability of enforcement outcomes and the relative harshness each
produces. Part III will discuss the negotiable character of mortgage
promissory notes. If a note is a negotiable instrument, then transfer of the
note may be analyzed under Article 3. However, even if a note is negotiable,
that does not mean that it is not also potentially subject to enforcement under
Article 9.
Part IV will provide an overview of enforcement mechanisms utilized in
various jurisdictions. This Part will highlight the law in jurisdictions in
which Article 3 is applied to determine the standing of foreclosure plaintiffs.
Following that, Part IV will review application of common law and other
enforcement mechanisms in jurisdictions that do not look to the U.C.C. in
determining a plaintiff’s standing to enforce a negotiable instrument and
foreclosure the security interest secured thereby. Finally, this Part will
explore recent cases in which Article 9 has been applied in the foreclosure
context.
Part V will argue that uniform application of the U.C.C. will aid the
recovering housing market and provide a predictable framework for
foreclosure of mortgage, going forward. Specifically, Part V will argue that
the U.C.C. should be applied to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to
foreclose and will further argue that courts should utilize Article 3 of the
Code in making such determinations.
I. STANDING AS A MAJOR INGREDIENT IN A FORECLOSURE DISPUTE
At its simplest, “standing” in a lawsuit means that a party has a sufficient
stake in a controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.15 An
action to foreclose a mortgage requires a plaintiff to either accelerate the
balance due on a note or await the maturity date of a note on which the
borrower has defaulted.16 An action to foreclose a mortgage also requires the
15

John Dimanno, Beyond Taxpayers’ Suits: Public Interest Standing in the States, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 639, 642 (2008) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972)). This
article will not discuss federal concepts, such as standing under Article 3 of the United States
Constitution or the “prudential” limitations on standing applied to federal cases, because
foreclosure is a state issue and standing in foreclosure cases is generally found in a state’s
application of its own version of the U.C.C. or in state common law. See Joseph William
Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and
How to Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. 497, 516 (2013) (arguing that one of the myriad problems
with the system employed by banks using Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,
referred to as “MERS,” was that they “operated in the context of a national or international
securities market, and did not focus on the fact that property law is state law”).
16
See generally R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the
Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1998) (discussing the different means
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plaintiff to foreclose the mortgage, which is given as security for the
repayment of the loan obligation, itemized in the note.17 A plaintiff in a
foreclosure action has standing to maintain the suit if the plaintiff has the
right to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage.18
Leading up to the 1998 amendments of the U.C.C. and continuing
thereafter, securitization of loans had become not only a standard practice in
mortgage banking, but had also received mixed praise for its ability provide
liquidity to banks while reducing funding needs.19 Due to the tendency to
transfer and/or securitize mortgage loans, a lender’s standing to enforce a
note and foreclose mortgage has become a critical issue in the litigation
surrounding mortgage foreclosure.20 Prior to the foreclosure crisis, the
banking industry developed a system whereby it used the Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, in its corporate form Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc., also referred to as “MERS,” to stand in for
lenders in mortgage transactions, acting in a nominal role.21 This system
allowed the mortgage to be placed in the name of MERS, for the benefit of
the lender.22 Lenders and mortgage servicers then transferred mortgages
within the MERS system, without the necessity and cost of recording
assignments of mortgage.23 Amongst other documentation issues, the MERS
system was highlighted for its deficiencies during the mortgage crisis.24
Although the standing of lenders and mortgage servicers has been
uniformly questioned since the crisis, the law surrounding standing to
foreclose a mortgage has not been uniformly harmonized. Different

by which a mortgagee may find itself “insecure” in its security interest and thus accelerate the
balance, be they “objective” violations, such as the failure to make payments, or “subjective”
violations, wherein a mortgagee may “deem itself insecure,” pursuant to RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS § 8.1).
17
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS § 5.4(c) (1997) (“A mortgage may be enforced
only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation the mortgage
secures.”).
18
Id.
19
The European Central Bank deployed this analysis of securitization, concluding that “asset
securitization increases banks’ liquidity while reducing banks’ funding needs in the event of
monetary tightening.” Yener Altunbas et al., Securitisation and the Bank Lending Channel,
(European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 838, Dec. 2012). Also of note was that
securitization “allows banks to swiftly transfer part of their credit risk to the markets,” which
feature enabled the global crisis that followed. See id.
20
Christopher Cifrino, Comment, Now UCC Me, Now You Don’t: The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court Ignores the UCC in Requiring Unity of Note and Mortgage for
Foreclosure in Eaton v. Fannie Mae, 54 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. 99, 103–04 (2013) (discussing
the difficulty in producing documentation that occurred in post-2007 mortgage foreclosure
case throughout the United States).
21
Singer, supra note 15, at 515.
22
See id.
23
See id. at 515–16.
24
Id. at 517–18.
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jurisdictions have developed different rules on the issue, and the law on this
subject is still developing, years later.25
II. THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABILITY AND THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS
In the context of the negotiability of mortgage notes, the historical
framework of negotiability should be analyzed alongside the historical
development of the law relating to foreclosure. The law of negotiability
developed as a fine-tuning process to enable the smooth function of
commerce,26 while the law of foreclosure developed around a power struggle
between borrowers and lenders. From a historical vantage point, it makes
sense to apply the collaboratively developed, and ultimately codified, rules of
negotiability to the haphazard laws of mortgage foreclosure, which were
cobbled together in a piecemeal, adversarial process that had no overarching
vision or goal.
Initially, during the sixteenth century, bills of exchange, which would
become the principal means of negotiation, were little used.27 At the same
time during England’s feudal period, real property transfers in England were
occasioned by the conveyance of an absolute deed from a borrower to a
lender, giving the lender the enormous power of being able to decline to
convey the deed upon the borrower’s failure to fulfill any term of the
agreement between the parties.28
The concept of negotiability arose in Europe, largely during the
seventeenth century, because merchants required a method to pay for goods.29
The early process for negotiating an instrument was a cumbersome fourparty exchange.30 While the concept of negotiability was just developing, the

25

For example, and as further discussed infra, the principle point of this article turns on the
lack of uniformity in the baseline decision of whether standing in a foreclosure action is
grounded in the Uniform Commercial Code and, if so, in which section.
26
American Securitization Forum, Transfer and Assignment of Residential Mortgage Loans in
the
Secondary
Mortgage
Market
3,
9–10
(2010),
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_White_Paper_11_16_10.pdf.
27
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over Intent in
Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 363, 377 (2002). Even then, such bills
could have been described as arcane.
28
Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional Approach to
Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 89 (1996). As can be imagined, this scheme left
borrowers without much, if any, recourse.
29
Ice, supra note 9; Eggert, supra note 27, at 377.
30
Eggert, supra note 27, at 378. This four-party exchange would involve: (1) the maker of the
bill; (2) the intended recipient of the funds; (3) a “drawer”; and (4) a “drawee.” A drawer
would draw a bill for the amount that the maker intended to pay to the intended recipient. The
bill was, in effect, an instruction for the drawee to pay the recipient. The drawee would
ultimately—and inefficiently—pay the sum. Eventually, and often through a course of
dealings, the drawee and drawer would settle their debts.
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use of bills of exchange remained fairly limited.31 During this period,
English real property common law developed the “equity of redemption,”
which swung power to borrowers by providing a right to redeem property by
paying any outstanding indebtedness within a “reasonable period.”32 The
equity of redemption caused manifest uncertainty in lenders, which led to
attempts by lenders to force borrowers to limit or waive the equity.33 Though
courts initially struck down the lenders’ attempts and claimed that lenders
were clogging the court system, lenders eventually persuaded the courts that
the “reasonable period” was too nebulous, and the courts began to require
that the equity be exercised within a specific timeframe, resulting in a
process of “strict foreclosure.”34 In cases of strict foreclosure, foreclosure of
the property interest did not extinguish a borrower’s underlying debt.35
Over time, the use of bills of exchange expanded, and so did the scope of
their use.36 Early limitations on negotiability were eliminated, and negotiable
instruments became more widely used and understood.37 Moreover, the
process of negotiability became streamlined, as instruments could now be
negotiated by a three-party or two-party exchange.38 While the process
surrounding negotiable instruments was being fine-tuned, early American
jurisprudence regarding foreclosure was beginning to develop, finding its
origins in the English common law.39 Early American courts viewed the
concept of strict foreclosure as unduly harsh and modified the foreclosure
process to include a public sale so that all, or at least a portion, of the

31

Id. at 380. A limited scope of use for bills of exchange appears to have been the
contemplated objective at the time, as they primarily concerned merchants dealing with
foreign trade. Limiting who could use bills of exchange, and with whom they could be used,
would have prevented common merchants from having to navigate a set of complex and
unfamiliar rules.
32
Mattingly, supra note 28, at 89. The “reasonable period” was itself undefined and largely
open to varying interpretations.
33
Id. at 90.
34
Id. at 90–91.
35
Id.
36
Eggert, supra note 27, at 380–81. This expansion began due to a bleeding of the definition
of who was a “merchant,” within the meaning of trade practices. The courts began to hold that
parties using bills intended to be treated as merchants, thus creating a tautology whereby only
merchants may use bills of exchange, but the limitation on merchants is practically delimited
to anybody who uses such a bill. However, over time, the merchant limitation was eliminated
altogether.
37
Id. at 381.
38
Id. at 381–82. A three-party exchange could involve the maker drawing the bill on the
maker, eliminating the need for a drawer. This exchange made it easier for makers and
intended recipients of funds to interact; however, in the event that the maker does not have a
course of dealings with the drawee, then it would have likely been more inconvenient for the
drawee to settle a single debt with numerous makers than it would have been to settle
numerous debts with a single drawer.
39
Mattingly, supra note 28, at 91.
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underlying indebtedness could be satisfied, and the borrower would not lose
the property and remain liable for the total debt.40
The foreclosure process splintered between states around whether the
foreclosure process should be a judicial action: some states now use a nonjudicial process with limited rights for borrowers, while other states will only
permit a foreclosure sale to occur after a lengthy lawsuit, in which borrowers
are entitled to full due-process rights and safeguards.41 The process of
foreclosure in judicial states thus productively provides access to the courts
and other dispute-resolution mechanisms for borrowers, but is comparatively
cumbersome and onerous, and can take years.42
Eventually, negotiability was codified in the Uniform Commercial Code,
specifically in Article 3. Codification provided three measurable benefits: it
relieved courts, attorneys, bankers, and merchants from having to learn and
apply multiple conflicting sets of law; it promoted the application of
harmonized amendments to the rules governing negotiable instruments; and
it further increased the negotiability of instruments, freeing them from local
impediments hindering their negotiability.43 The process of negotiability
thus democratized and developed from an arcane set of principals used by
few people in a limited set of circumstances as a substitute for money into a
robust, uniform process for use in various settings and available to just about
anybody. The concept of negotiability has already expanded from its initial
limited application as a private currency for merchants, and its function
within the mortgage foreclosure process brings predictability and uniformity
to an otherwise chaotic and unwieldy process.44
III. NEGOTIABILITY OF MORTGAGE PROMISSORY NOTES
A. Mortgage Promissory Notes as Negotiable Instruments
Typically, mortgage promissory notes are negotiable instruments.45
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a negotiable instrument is defined as
follows:

40

Id.
See id. at 92.
42
Id. at 93 (providing that “a nonjudicial foreclosure skirts the court system”).
43
Eggert, supra note 27, at 408–09 (stating that parties were also freed from “latent”
impediments to negotiability, such as, perhaps, claims that mortgage notes in national
circulation are not negotiable under a particular state’s interpretation).
44
See Renuart, supra note 2, at 1207 (stating that, in the context of non-uniform application of
the U.C.C., “[t]he possibility of unnecessarily inconsistent outcomes is real and harmful to the
homeowners, litigants, and the integrity of the legal system”).
45
The prevailing view with regard to the negotiability of mortgage notes is that “most
mortgage notes are negotiable instrument governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.” Singer, supra note 15, at 526.
41
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[A]n unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount
of money, with or without interest or other charges described
in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or
first comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the
person promising or ordering payment to do any act in
addition to the payment of money, but the promise or
order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to give,
maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an
authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment
or realize on or dispose of collateral, or (iii) a waiver of
the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or
protection of an obligor.46
To be negotiable, a promissory note should be free from contingencies and
memoranda that would control it.47 However, a promissory note may
nevertheless reference an additional document, such as a mortgage that
secures the debt.48
Most courts accept that mortgage notes are negotiable instruments, and
apply their state’s version of Article 3.49 Questions may arise concerning the
certainty and unconditionality of mortgage promissory notes.50 However,
promises in promissory notes are presumed to be unconditional.51 Moreover,
a promissory note is not made conditional simply by reference to a mortgage
46

U.C.C. § 3-104 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (Pa. 1846) (holding that a note which is not free some such
contingencies or which contains “a memorandum” which controls “it, though endorsed on it,
would be incorporated with it and would destroy it” is not a “courier without luggage” and is
thus non-negotiable). The mere recital of the existence of a separate agreement, such as a
mortgage, does not eviscerate the negotiability of the reciting note. Robert T. Tobin,
Negotiable Instruments — Due Date of Notice — Effect of Acceleration Clause in Mortgage
— Poultrymen’s Service Corp. v. Brown, 4 B.C. LAW REV. 772 (1963).
48
U.C.C. § 3-106, cmt.1.
49
White, supra note 3, at 473 (citing a case from Massachusetts and Dale Whitman, How
Negotiability Has Fouled up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It, 37
PEPP. L. REV. 2 (2010), which surveyed “cases that either address negotiability or assume
mortgage notes are negotiable”). White asserts “some provisions of U.C.C. Article 9 arguably
permit proof of a mortgage note transfer without endorsement and delivery, by proving the
existence of a separate written agreement to sell the note.” Id. at 474. However, such a
circumstance, arguable as it is, would nonetheless only apply in a vacuum created by a failure
to negotiate the note, meaning that Article 3 could never have been the determinant, to begin
with.
50
See GMAC v. Honest Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 933 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006) (expressing that a negotiable instrument should be “simple, certain, unconditional,
and subject to no contingencies.”).
51
See U.C.C. § 3-106(a) (providing that “a promise or order is unconditional unless . . .”).
47
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or its terms.52
Article 3 specifically contemplates that the express
incorporation into a promissory note of an external set of promises does not
affect the negotiability of the note; instead, a negotiable note which refers to
a mortgage that contains non-negotiable terms, and which states that the note
is made in consideration for the mortgage, is negotiable because any
executory promise contained in the mortgage is merely a permissible,
implied condition in the note.53 Finally, Section 3-106 of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides that mortgage promissory notes are negotiable,
inasmuch as “[m]any notes issued in commercial transactions are secured by
collateral, are subject to acceleration in the event of default, or are subject to
prepayment. . . . In some cases it may be convenient not to include a
statement concerning collateral, prepayment, or acceleration . . . , but rather
to refer to an accompanying loan agreement, security agreement, or mortgage
for that statement.”54 Consequently, mortgage promissory notes are nearly
per se negotiable.
It bears noting that the U.C.C. contemplates that Article 3 may be
applied to determine enforceability of an instrument that is not negotiable.
The Official Comment 2 to Section 3-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code
expresses that courts “could not arrive at a result similar to the result that
would follow if the writing were a negotiable instrument,” and that “it may
be appropriate . . . for a court to apply one or more provisions of Article 3 to
the writing by analogy.”55 Therefore, it is functionally irrelevant whether a
particular mortgage promissory note is in fact negotiable, so long as the
courts have expressed an interest in treating such notes as negotiable.
B. Lenders’ Right to Claim Status as a “Holder”
Almost as a matter of course, plaintiff lenders in foreclosure actions
encounter defenses regarding their standing to sue or their status as a real
party in interest. There are many avenues to establish standing in a
foreclosure action, and a plaintiff may be in a position to acquire standing
through more than one means at a time.56 Where the note at issue is a
52

See U.C.C. § 3-106(b) (providing that “[a] promise or order is not made conditional . . . by a
reference to another record for a statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment or
acceleration”); see also American Securitization Forum, supra note 26, at 10.
53
See U.C.C. § 3-106, cmt.1.
54
Id.
55
U.C.C. § 3-104, cmt. 2; see also Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell, The Law of Modern
Payment Systems § 1.03[1][b] (2003).
56
See McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 79 So. 3d 170, 172–73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012) (holding that standing may be established by any of the following: (a) a mortgage
assignment or equitable transfer prior to the filing of the complaint; (b) plaintiff’s status as a
holder; (c) a special endorsement in favor of plaintiff or a blank endorsement; (d) an
assignment from the payee to the plaintiff or an affidavit of ownership to prove plaintiff’s
status as a holder of the note; (e) mere delivery of a note and mortgage, with intent to pass
title; or (f) filing the original note with a special endorsement in favor of plaintiff). McLean
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negotiable instrument, a lender may establish standing as either a “holder in
due course” or merely as a “holder.” The decision to establish standing as a
holder is both beneficial and disadvantageous to a lender.
Negotiability presents the possibility of a transferee taking a position that
is better than the transferor.57 The Uniform Commercial Code defines a
number of different possible parties to a negotiation. There are three general
positions that a transferee can occupy in a transfer under a negotiable
instrument: the transferee can occupy a better position, a same position, or a
worse position, with each position being relative to the transferor.58
Typically, lenders in foreclosure actions occupy the same or worse position,
given their frequent status as a “holder,”59 rather than the better position of a
“holder in due course.”60
Under Article 3, a “holder in due course” occupies a privileged
position.61 Specifically, a holder in due course is insulated from numerous
defenses to the right to enforce an instrument. A holder in due course is
susceptible only to the “real defenses” of a borrower or other interested
party.62 The real defenses include claims of infancy, essential fraud,
insolvency, duress, incapacity, or illegality.63 Though there is an assumption
of good faith in Article 3 dealings,64 a holder in due course is still protected
from many defenses to the right to enforce.

has been cited in sixty cases since 2012, including multiple federal cases, and state cases in
Kansas, New Hampshire, Ohio, and South Dakota. The pertinent analysis has been distilled
into a tighter framework, in which a plaintiff in a foreclosure case who is not the original
lender “may establish standing . . . by submitting a note with a blank or special indorsement,
an assignment of the note, or an affidavit otherwise proving his status as holder of the note.”
Pennington v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 151 So. 3d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
57
Curtis Nyquist, A Spectrum Theory of Negotiability, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 897, 907–08 (1995)
(calling negotiability “a fundamental and indispensable way of thinking about transfers of
property”).
58
Id. at 904.
59
Id. at 953 (explaining that a holder who fails to comply with the strictures of Article 3 takes
a note in a worse position, whereas a holder who fully complies may take a same position).
60
A holder in due course is a holder, where there is an absence of apparent evidence of
forgery, alteration, or irregularity at the time of issuance or negotiation, and where the
instrument is take for value, in good faith, without notice of the instrument being overdue,
dishonored, or in default, without notice of an unauthorized signature or alteration, without
notice of a claim to the instrument, and without notice of a defense or claim in recoupment.
U.C.C. § 3-302(a). Contrast this with that of a holder, who is merely “the person in possession
of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the
person in possession.” U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A). The position of a holder in due course,
while providing protection from certain defenses, is more difficult to claim and obtain, and
thus less frequently used in a typical foreclosure dispute.
61
Nyquist, supra note 57, at 904 (arguing that holder in due course status represents the
“archetypal ‘better than’ position”).
62
Id. at 928–29.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 929.
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Alternatively, a “holder” is merely “the person in possession of a
negotiable instrument that is [made] payable to bearer or to an identified
person that is the person in possession.”65 By claiming to simply be a holder,
rather than a holder in due course, foreclosure plaintiffs are not subjected to
certain questions about actual ownership of notes and mortgages.66
However, status as a holder leaves lenders open to defenses from which
holders in due course would be shielded, and, additionally, opens up the
possibility for counterclaims, such as claims arising under the Federal Truth
in Lending Act or other federal or state statutes.67 Pleading as a holder,
therefore, entitles a lender to certain evidentiary privileges—while balancing
those privileges with added rights and defenses for borrowers and third
parties.
C. The Thief’s “Right” to Enforce a Note
In a technical sense, a note holder may be a “thief,” inasmuch as the
holder may be in wrongful possession of the note and may not actually own
the note.68 Section 3-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
“[a] person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though
the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of
the instrument.”69 Therefore, a close reading of Section 3-301 may lead to
the assumption that a thief will be duly authorized to enforce mortgage
promissory notes in open court.70 However, such a reading is at odds with
the reality of mortgage promissory note enforcement. Two principles of
negotiable instrument enforcement contribute to solve the anomaly of a
thief’s enforcement: the authorization principle and the negligence
principle.71 Additionally, the right to enforce lost or stolen instruments
generally prevents thieves from enforcing mortgage promissory notes.72
The enforcement of instruments is governed in part by the authorization
principle, which may be stated either by the maxim “authorization imposes

65

U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A); see also Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at 683–84;
Timothy R. Zinnecker, Extending Enforcement Rights to Assignees of Lost, Destroyed, or
Stolen Negotiable Instruments Under U.C.C. Article 3: A Proposal for Reform, 50 U. KAN. L.
REV. 111, 113 (2001); American Securitization Forum, supra note 26, at 12 (noting that, while
the term “possession” is not defined in the U.C.C., it is generally permissible for a holder to
constructively possess a note).
66
Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency,
and Accuracy in Foreclosures, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 551, 562 (2011).
67
Id.
68
Ice, supra note 11, at 11–12.
69
U.C.C. § 3-301.
70
See id.
71
L. Ali Khan, A Theoretical Analysis of Payment Systems, 60 S.C. L. REV. 425, passim
(2008).
72
Zinnecker, supra note 65, 131–32.
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liability” or, alternatively, by the aphorism “no authorization; no liability.”73
In essence, the person who authorizes a negotiation is liable for the
negotiation. The authorization principle serves the function of equity,74
purposefully overlooking forged or missing endorsements to achieve the end
of inquiring whether the payment is made to the intended payee.75 In
practice, the authorization principle resolves whether a thief may enforce a
mortgage promissory note: it is unlikely that a court will allow a thief to both
steal an instrument and subsequently argue that said thief is entitled to
enforce the instrument as that would force the obligor, as a matter of law, to
pay the instrument.76
Moreover, in the unlikely event that the thief is entitled to enforce a
mortgage promissory note, Article 3 provides for a just allocation of loss.
The depository bank that the thief deals with will ultimately bear the loss,
because the thief will be unlikely to reimburse the bank.77 This theory of loss
is acceptable under Article 3 because the one who deals with the wrongdoer
must suffer the loss.78 Effectively, the depository bank is charged with
ensuring that it is not allowing a thief to profit.79
In addition to the authorization principle, the negligence principle
provides for equitable allocation of loss in the unlikely event that a thief is
able to effectively enforce a mortgage promissory note. A party whose
negligence contributes substantially to the alteration or forgery of an
instrument is held liable.80 The negligence principle, which is robustly
applied to negotiable instruments, simply requires persons to use care when
issuing, transferring, debiting, and crediting payment orders.81
Finally, the right to enforce lost or stolen instruments prevents thieves
from enforcing mortgage promissory notes. Under Section 3-301(iii), a
former holder may enforce a lost, stolen, or destroyed instrument.82 The
purpose of this enforcement right as to stolen instruments is to take the
“criminal mind” into account and to prevent the inequity of a thief being
entitled to enforce a note.83 Article 3 has multiple, redundant safeguards to
prevent the enforcement of a mortgage promissory note by a thief,
notwithstanding the fact that such enforcement is technically possible.
73

Khan, supra note 71, at 434.
Equity is important in these disputes, because foreclosure is generally an equitable remedy,
rather than a remedy at law. See Andrew J. Kazakes, Developments in the Law: Protecting
Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage
Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 LOY. L. REV. 1383, 1393 (2010).
75
Khan, supra note 71, at 444.
76
Id. at 445–46.
77
See id. at 447–48.
78
Id.
79
Id. (providing that the theory is consistent with international negotiable instrument law).
80
Id. at 458.
81
Khan, supra note 71, at 458–59
82
U.C.C. § 3-301(iii) (2002).
83
Zinnecker, supra note 65, at 131–32.
74
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D. Plaintiff Holder’s Right to Foreclose the Mortgage
As the holder of a mortgage promissory note, a lender plaintiff is entitled
to enforce the mortgage securing the note. A genesis of cases following
reasoning akin to that found in Johns v. Gillian holds that a note-holder is
entitled to enforce a mortgage because the mortgage follows the note.84 The
holding that the mortgage follows the note facilitates the secondary mortgage
market, and is so universal that every state except for Minnesota follows it.85
There has been recent pushback against the concept that the mortgage
follows the note, in which borrowers have attempted to argue that Johns has
been misapplied in case law for almost one hundred years, and therefore
should entitle only the owner to enforce the mortgage, rather than the
holder.86 The attack generally centers on the factual circumstances in Johns,
and applies those facts to all cases claiming that the mortgage follows the
note.87 However, it is generally understood that a note-holder may foreclose
a mortgage, and a plaintiff need only establish entitlement to enforce the note
in order to demonstrate its ability to foreclose the incidental mortgage; such a
plaintiff need not demonstrate ownership of the note.88
IV. APPLICATION IN VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS:
THE TREND TOWARD ENFORCEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 9
Prior to amendment, Article 9 of the U.C.C. governed only conventional
security interests in personal property.89 The reach of Article 9 was
expanded by amendments in 1972 and, subsequently, in 1998.90 Based on the
1998 amendments and state legislation adopted thereafter, there are recent
attempts to forego determining who is entitled to enforce a note by way of its
negotiability and instead to apply portions of the U.C.C. that deal with
secured transactions as opposed to negotiable instruments.91 These attempts
may have begun with the Massachusetts case U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, in
which a promissory note was prosecuted as though it had been given in the
84

Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140 (Fla. 1938).
Ann M. Burkhart, Third Party Defenses to Mortgages, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1003, 1012–13
(1998) (providing that “courts in all but one state hold that a negotiable instrument imparts its
quality of negotiability to the mortgage”).
86
Ice, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 36–39; Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at passim.
87
Ice, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 36–39; Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at passim.
88
See Chris Markus, Ron Taylor & Blake Vogt, From Main Street to Wall Street: Mortgage
Loan Securitization and New Challenges Facing Foreclosure Plaintiffs in Kentucky, 36 N. KY.
L. REV. 395, 406–07 (2009).
89
Renuart, supra note 2, at 1224 (discussing the original drafting of Article 9).
90
Id.
91
Ice, supra note 11, at ¶¶ 36–39; Weidner and Fulchino, supra note 11, at passim; White,
supra note 32, at 473 (2012).
85
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context of a sale according to non-U.C.C. state law.92 Recently, in HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, a Florida court applied Article 9 to determine who
was entitled to enforce a mortgage in a dispute between two entities claiming
to have received a first mortgage for the same property from the same
borrower. 93
The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. identified four rules with
regard to enforcement of mortgage promissory notes and mortgages.94 First,
Article 3 determines who is entitled to enforce a negotiable note.95 Second,
Article 9 determines whether a property right attaches to a transferee of a
note.96 Third, Article 9 provides an attached property right in the mortgage
to a transferee with an attached property right in a note.97 Fourth, Article 9
enables an owner of a note and mortgage to record its interest for the purpose
of seeking remedies in non-judicial states.98 However, each of the
aforementioned Article 9 rules appears to apply more easily in the context of
non-judicial foreclosure states, because in a judicial state the rules would
appear to conflict with Article 3 determinations of entitlement to enforce a
negotiable note. Moreover, the U.C.C. is not adopted in the same manner in
each state, and each state’s case law applies different reasoning with regard
to their individual statutory schemes.
This section will discuss this trend, with focus on development in eleven
states, to wit: California, Tennessee, Arizona, South Carolina, Indiana,
Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, Colorado, New York, and Florida.99 In
federal or state courts in certain jurisdictions, borrowers have attempted to
argue that Article 9 governs any determinations that the court would make,
and have been rebuffed. In at least one state, the courts have decided that the
U.C.C. is per se inapplicable to mortgage foreclosures. In other jurisdictions,
there is an apparent tilt toward the application of Article 9 to determine who
is entitled to enforce the note and foreclose the mortgage. This section will
focus first on jurisdictions that apply Article 3, then on jurisdictions that do
not look to the U.C.C. to determine who may foreclose a mortgage, and
finally to jurisdictions in which Article 9 is being utilized.
92

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Ibanez, 941 N.E. 2d 40 (Mass. 2011).
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, 165 So. 3d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
94
See Renuart, supra note 2, at 1241.
95
Report of the Editorial Board, supra note 1.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
A comprehensive list of where states stood on this issue, as of 2013, is detailed in the article
Uneasy Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the U.C.C. See Renuart, supra note 2, at
1243–50. However, the ground appears to have shifted since then, with either state or federal
opinions in a number of jurisdictions clarifying the states’ application of the U.C.C. or
reversing course on this issue. Professor Renuart determined that there are three categories of
states, subsequent to the Article 9 revisions: states which rely on the U.C.C. to provide the
result, states which utilize other state law and the U.C.C. to provide the result, and state which
rely on other state law, which law may conflict with the U.C.C. Id. at 1254.
93
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A. Article 3 Jurisdictions
1. California: In re Smith
The U.C.C. is codified in California’s Commercial Code.100 In In re
Smith,101 the court reviewed whether, under the Commercial Code, a
mortgage promissory note is a negotiable instrument, along with the question
of whether enforcement of the note should be determined by Article 3 or
Article 9.102
The argument in In re Smith turned on the securitization of the note—the
borrower argued that the note was governed by Article 9 because the note
had been transferred to a third-party pool of loans.103 The court held that
“securitization does not change the obligation of the borrower to pay the note
or the note holder’s right to foreclose.”104 The court reasoned that Article 3
of the U.C.C. “pertains to negotiable instruments,” while “Article 9 governs
the sale of most payment rights, including the sale of both negotiable and
non-negotiable notes.”105 The court noted, however, that “the sale of a
promissory note under Article 9 does not necessarily change the identity of
the person entitled to enforce the note.”106 Ultimately, the court ruled that the
note holder was entitled to enforce the note, regardless of the impact of any
securitization of the loan.107
2. Tennessee: Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Tibbs
In Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Tibbs,108 plaintiff lender sought a
declaration regarding priority and enforceability of a deed of trust lien.109
The borrowers argued that plaintiff was required to prove ownership of the
“mortgage loan, note and deed of trust” because the loan had been sold.110
The borrowers further alleged that the plaintiff could not establish a right to
enforce the note by being a holder under Article 3 of the U.C.C. because
100

CAL. COM. CODE, passim (West).
In re Smith, 509 B.R. 260 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2014).
102
Id. at 265.
103
Id. The borrower, as plaintiff in an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court, argued that
the note could not be enforced, so long as it was held in a securitized trust. Id.
104
Id. The latter half of this holding, that the holder’s right to foreclose is unaffected by
securitization, places this case in a seemingly-eroding framework, as discussed, infra.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
In re Smith, 509 B.R. at 268–69; see also In re Nordeen, 495 B.R. 468, 479–80 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2013).
108
No. 3:11-0763, 2014 WL 280365, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
109
Plaintiff alternatively sought damages for the borrowers’ purported involvement in a
conspiracy to deprive the bank of its rights in the property. Id.
110
Id. at *2.
101
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Article 3 is inapplicable to the sale of mortgage notes.111 Instead, the
borrowers argued that Article 9 controlled the case because the transfer of the
mortgage and/or promissory note is within the purview of Article 9.112
The court noted “similar arguments have been soundly rejected.”113 The
court then reasoned that, although Article 9 applies to the sale of promissory
notes, Article 3 provides the rules governing payments.114 Additionally, the
court held that a holder may enforce a note that has been sold, even if the
holder is not the owner of the note.115 Tibbs, therefore, seems to place
Tennessee into states utilizing Article 3 for purposes of determining the right
to enforce sold or securitized mortgage notes.116
3. Arizona: In re Tarantola
Arizona follows the rule that Article 3 of the U.C.C. governs the
enforcement of mortgage notes. In In re Tarantola,117 the sole question was
whether a trustee of a securitized mortgage pool had standing to enforce a
promissory note secured by a deed of trust.118 The trustee filed a motion for
relief from the stay imposed by the bankruptcy case.119 The borrower
responded by claiming that the trustee did not have standing to seek relief
from the stay, which argument the court initially accepted, because the
trustee did not demonstrate its entitlement to enforce the note due to a failure
to “produce competent evidence of its standing because it did not provide
critical securitization documents.”120 In the decision regarding the motion for
relief from stay, the court found that “for Defendant to have a colorable
claim sufficient to be granted relief from the automatic stay, Defendant had
to either own the Note or be entitled to enforce it.”121
111

Id.
Id. It does not appear that the borrowers reconciled the fact that a negotiation is, itself, a
transfer. See U.C.C. § 3-201(a); U.C.C. § 3-203(b).
113
Id. (citing In re Connelly, 487 B.R. 230, 240 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2013).
114
Tibbs, No. 3:11-0763, 2014 WL 280365, at *3.
115
Id. The court also ruled against the borrowers on procedural grounds, for failure to
properly preserve the issue.
116
See id. at passim.
117
491 B.R. 111 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2013).
118
Id. at 113. In re Tarantola arises out of an adversary proceeding in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy case.
119
Id. at 114.
120
Id. (indicating that the trustee also provided “conflicting versions of the Note in a series of
submissions that was. . . frankly, inept and alarming.”).
121
Id. The court discussed that a showing of entitlement to enforce a note could be made by
any of the following: (1) a demonstration that indorsements on the note were executed by
parties with authority to act for the owners of the note at the time of each indorsement’s
execution; (2) a demonstration that the note was properly transferred to a pool pursuant to a
governing pooling and servicing agreement; or (3) a demonstration that the note was
transferred to a pool pursuant to a governing mortgage loan purchase agreement. The first of
these methods goes against the Article 3 presumption of validity of endorsements, and
112
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Following the motion for relief from stay, the case proceeded to trial, and
the parties submitted post-trial memoranda.122 The borrower reiterated the
position that the note is not a negotiable instrument and that Article 9 of the
U.C.C. provides the controlling law.123 The court determined that, because
the trustee was the holder of the note, the trustee was entitled to enforce the
note and foreclose the mortgage pursuant to Article 3.124 Further, the court
specifically rejected the argument that Article 9 could provide the governing
law for the case.125
4. South Carolina: Swindler v. Swindler
There are occasions where the application of Article 3 serves to prevent
the foreclosure of a mortgage. Swindler v. Swindler presents such an
occasion. 126 A family brought an action to foreclose a mortgage against their
sister-in-law, who claimed that the debt had been renounced when the
family’s mother had given the defendant possession of the original note.127
If Article 3 of the U.C.C. did not govern the note in Swindler then the
note would not have been subject to renunciation by transfer of possession to
the debtor.128 The parties did not dispute that the note was a negotiable
instrument.129 However, the lower court found that, although the note was a
negotiable instrument within the meaning of Article 3, it was nonetheless
subject to the provisions of Article 9.130 The appellate court reversed,
reasoning “nothing in Article 9 provides a limitation on the applicability to
notes secured by mortgages on real estate.”131

constrains the free exchange of commercial paper. The latter two methods would require a
plaintiff in a foreclosure dispute to offer proof of contracts or transactions to which the
borrower would be neither a party nor a third party beneficiary.
122
Id. at 116–18.
123
In re Tarantola, 491 B.R. at 116–18.
124
Id. at 118–19 (acknowledging that, even if the trustee were not a holder of the note, under
exceptions found in Article 3, the trustee may still have had the right to foreclose as a
nonholder in possession of the instrument).
125
Id. at 120-21 (holding that “Plaintiff’s argument that Article 9 provides the governing law
of this case is not meritorious”).
126
Swindler v. Swindler, 584 S.E. 2d 438 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing a judgment of
foreclosure).
127
Id.
128
See id. at 441–42.
129
Id. at 440.
130
Id. South Carolina’s adaptation of the U.C.C. contains a statute that provides that “[t]he
provisions of this chapter are subject to the provisions of the chapter on . . . secured
transactions.” Id.
131
Swindler, 584 S.E. 2d at 441. The court went on to reason that, under the facts in Swindler,
there was no conflict between any provision of Article 3 and Article 9. Id. The analysis in
Swindler arguably does not apply to a situation in which a note is sold, securitized, or
otherwise transferred to a third party.
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5. Indiana: First Valley Bank v. First Sav. and Loan Ass’n of Central
Indiana
In First Valley Bank,132 First Valley Bank was held liable in eighteen
separate summary judgments as an endorser with recourse of mortgage
notes.133 First Valley Bank appealed, arguing in part that mortgage notes are
not negotiable instruments and raising issues concerning Article 9 of the
U.C.C.134 First, the court explained that Article 3 of the U.C.C. applies to a
promissory note secured by a mortgage.135 Rejecting the bank’s argument to
the contrary, the court held that “mortgage notes are subject to the general
law of negotiable instruments. . . without regard to the fact that they are
affected with an interest in real property.”136
Secondly, the court concluded that Article 9 did not operate as to trump
enforcement under Article 3 with regard to mortgage promissory notes.137
Indiana’s adaptation of the U.C.C. has a common clause regarding Articles 3
and 9, stating that Article 3 is made subject to the provisions of Article 9.138
However, because Article 9 does not apply “to the creation or transfer of an
interest or lien on real estate,” the court found that Article 9 “has no
provisions relating to mortgage of real property.”139 The court cites to a
comment to section 9-104(j), which cites two cases dealing with a security
interest given by a mortgagee, and concluded that both cases hold that “a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument takes the mortgage freed of
personal defenses.”140 Therefore, even in a situation in which the mortgagee
gives an Article 9 security interest to a third party in Indiana, the holder
analysis in Article 3 controls enforcement of the note and the attendant right
to foreclose the mortgage.
B. Non-U.C.C. Jurisdictions
1. Michigan: Al-Raeis v. Aurora Bank, FSB
In Al-Raeis v. Aurora Bank, FSB,141 the Michigan court affirmed a
finding that summary disposition was appropriate in a non-judicial
132

412 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
Id. at 1239.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 1241 (holding that “[s]o far as Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is
concerned, a promissory note secured by a mortgage is a negotiable instrument”).
136
Id.
137
See id.
138
Id.
139
First Valley Bank, 412 N.E.2d at 1241. The court goes so far as to hold that “UCC’s 9104(j) silences Article 9 as to real estate mortgages.”
140
Id.
141
No. 3136269, 2014 WL 6953557 (Mich. App. Dec. 9, 2014).
133
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foreclosure.142 The borrower brought an appeal, claiming that she had
standing to challenge the sale.143 Challenging a Michigan statute related to
the specific process of foreclosure by advertisement,144 the borrower alleged
that certain assignments of mortgage were not accompanied by the
promissory note.145 The borrower’s argument involved a claim under both
Articles 3 and 9, averring that a party seeking to enforce or negotiate a
promissory note must be in possession of the note.146
The court, reasoning under Michigan statutes unrelated to an adaptation
of the U.C.C., held that the promissory note was functionally irrelevant to an
ability to foreclose the mortgage,147 and further found that, as a third party to
the subject assignments of mortgage, the borrower did not have standing to
challenge the assignments.148 Specifically, the court in Al-Raeis rejected
application of the U.C.C. to the foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement
wholesale, and held that a “mortgage instrument” is not a “negotiable
instrument.”149 The court does not discuss the impact of the note having the
142

Id. at *1. Michigan permits a foreclosure to occur by advertised sale, following which a
party may move for summary disposition, provided that there is neither an allegation of fraud
or irregularity in the sale process or a judicial determination regarding any claims prior to the
expiration of the state’s redemption period. See id.
143
Id.
144
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3204(3) (West 2014) (providing that “[i]f the party
foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement is not the original mortgagee, a record chain of title
must exist before the date of sale . . . evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the party
foreclosing the mortgage”).
145
Al-Raeis, 2014 WL 6953557 at *3.
146
Id. Were the party to establish the right to enforce a lost note, actual possession would not
be required. However, the foreclosing party in the case did not allege that it was entitled to
enforce a lost note. As a result, that question was not a part of the borrower’s argument or the
court’s reasoning.
147
Id. at *3–4.
148
Id. The court’s announcement that a third party may not challenge assignments of a
mortgage is a frequent refrain in foreclosure disputes, and extends in certain jurisdictions to
other documents related to transfers of security instruments, including pooling and servicing
agreements. See Velasco v. Sec. Nat. Mortgage Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (D. Haw.
2011) aff'd, 508 F. App’x 679 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); McGill v. Impac CMB Trust
Series 2007-A, No. 6:12-cv-1142-Orl-28TBS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112575, at *5–6 (M.D.
Fla. July 18, 2013) (citations omitted); Coursen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 8:12-cv-690T-26EAJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144295, *33–34, (M.D. Fla. June 27, 2013) (citations
omitted); Castillo v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 89 So. 3d 1069, 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012); Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n v. Bassman FBT, L.L.C., 2012 981 N.E.2d 1, 7, ¶ 15 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012), modified on denial of reh'g, (Dec. 7, 2012) (citations omitted).
149
Al-Raeis, 2014 WL 6953557, at *3–4. The language used by the court in Al-Raeis on this
point is curious, because the reference to a “mortgage instrument” could seemingly be a
reference to either the mortgage note or the mortgage, itself. The citation to Mox v. Jordan
provides some clarity, because the court in Mox was clearly discussing a mortgage: “A
mortgage merely secures payment of the negotiable instrument.” 463 N.W.2d 114, 115
(1990). Although Al-Raeis appears limited to foreclosures by advertisement, “several courts
in” the Eastern District of Michigan “have held that the U.C.C. does not apply to mortgage
foreclosures.” Berry v. Main St. Bank, 977 F. Supp. 2d 766, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
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property of a negotiable instrument, or whether a mortgage note is deemed to
have such a quality under Michigan law.150
2. Massachusetts
a. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez
In U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, trustees had foreclosed on two
properties and then purchased the properties back at the foreclosure sales.151
The trustees filed complaints seeking a declaration that they held clear title to
the properties.152 The court held that the trustees did not demonstrate that
they had standing to foreclose, and therefore held that the foreclosures sales
were not valid to convey title to the properties.153 The court invalidated the
sales without relying on the U.C.C., and instead applied Massachusetts
common law.154
b. Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n
In Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n,155 the Massachusetts court analyzed
a fact pattern in which the borrower executed a note in favor of BankUnited
FSB and a mortgage in favor of MERS, Inc., acting as nominee for
BankUnited FSB.156 The mortgage was assigned to Green Tree Servicing,
LLC, which attempted to foreclose the mortgage following a default for
failure of the borrower to make payments.157 Green Tree was the highest
bidder at the sale and assigned its bid to Federal National Mortgage
Association.158
Upon the borrower’s refusal to vacate and surrender the property,
eviction proceedings were commenced.159
The borrower filed a
counterclaim, alleging that foreclosure should not have occurred because the
foreclosing party was only in possession of the mortgage, and was not in
150

See generally Al-Raeis, 2014 WL 6953557.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Mass. 2011).
152
Id.
153
Id. at 53.
154
Id. at 54.
155
969 N.E.2d 1118, 1127–28 (2012). Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure state, which
permits foreclosures to occur by a vehicle called a “power of sale.” Following the sale of the
property, a borrower may attempt to prevent eviction or reverse the foreclosure, by means of
judicial process. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 21.
156
Eaton, 969 N.E. 2d at 1121–22 (citations and footnotes omitted). Listing MERS as a
nominee for the lender is a typical practice, which creates a nominal interest in MERS, mainly
permitting mortgages to be transferred within the MERS system. Id. This has led to problems
related to record-keeping, which are more fully elucidated elsewhere. See Id. at 1131–33.
157
Id. at 1122.
158
Id. at 1122–23.
159
Id. at 1123.
151
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possession of the note.160 Federal National Mortgage Association was
enjoined from interfering with the property, and an appeal commenced.161
The borrower argued on appeal that Article 3 of the U.C.C. governed the
question of whether Green Tree had been entitled to enforce the note.162
Rather than turn to Article 3 or Article 9 of the U.C.C., the court
reasoned through Chapter 183 and Chapter 244 of the Massachusetts General
Laws.163 The court arrived at the conclusion that the entity foreclosing the
mortgage must also have the ability to enforce the note.164 Although the
court arrived at a similar result to what would have likely occurred were it to
have analyzed the case through the prism of Article 3, the case failed to
create a precedential imperative to apply article 3 to mortgage foreclosures in
Massachusetts.165
3. Illinois: In re Haase
In a heavily litigated bankruptcy action, the bailor of cattle, which were
improperly sold by the debtor at a livestock auction sale, sought the proceeds
of the sale and had priority over a bank’s claim to the subject proceeds.166 In
In re Haase, as one of the bank’s claims to priority, the bank attempted to
argue entitlement to priority by virtue of being a holder in due course,
pursuant to Article 3 of the U.C.C.167 The court held that a stranger to an
agreement which is otherwise governed by Article 3 does not have their
rights determined by Article 3.168
The analysis begins by noting that Article 3 applies to negotiable
instruments and governs the rights and obligations of those who are parties to
or are in possession of negotiable instruments.169 With regard to the
underlying transaction, the following parties engaged in the transaction: the
debtor who sold a non-party’s cattle through an auction, the auction that
issued the check for the sale, and the banks that drew and deposited the

160

Id.
Id.
162
Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Eaton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118 (2012)
(No. SJC-1104), 2011 WL 4826356, at *3.
163
Eaton, 969 N.E. 2d at passim. The court additionally utilized reasoning from common law,
which itself was not premised upon either of the subject articles of the U.C.C. See id.
164
Id. at 1132–33.
165
In fact, it has been noted that “the court’s failure to address the UCC” goes so far as to
obfuscate “the relationship between the UCC and foreclosures in Massachusetts.” Cifrino,
supra note 20, at 110. The opinion in Eaton represents a pattern in Massachusetts, because it
was “not the first time the SJC has neglected the UCC in a mortgage context” and citing
Ibanez as contradicting Article 9. Id. at 110–11.
166
In re Haase, 224 B.R. 673, 678 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. (citing W. Grp. Nurseries v. Pomeranz, 867 P.2d 12, 16 (Colo. App. 1993)).
161
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check.170 The court in In re Haase rejects the application of Article 3, for
one sole reason: the case does not involve the four parties to the exchange,
but instead involves the non-party—a bailor, whose bailed cattle was
improperly sold.171
C. Potential Article 9 Jurisdictions
1. Colorado: Western Group Nurseries, Inc. v. Pomeranz
Western Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v. Pomeranz presents a dispute related to
notes and security agreements that does not expressly deal with mortgage
foreclosure, but does revolve in pertinent part around whether application of
Article 3 or Article 9 of the U.C.C. is appropriate.172 The case arose out of
the sale of nursery stock and other assets, and the simultaneous sale of the
subject assets by the purchaser to a third-party company, when the second
sale involved a security agreement.173 The notes in the transactions did not
specifically bar a suit against the limited partners of the initial seller.174
The limited partners moved for summary judgment, claiming that
application of Article 3 of the U.C.C. restricted their liability, due to the
contents of the security agreements between the parties.175 The first
purchaser filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, seeking application of
Article 9 of the U.C.C., which would not contain such a restriction.176 The
lower court entered summary judgment in favor of the first purchaser.177
Finding that the trial court did not err in its application of Article 9, the
court reasoned that Article 9, in addition to applying to security interests in
personal property and fixtures, also applied to security interests created by
contract, including security interests arising by pledge or by assignment.178
Noting that a security interest is an interest in property that secures payment

170

In re Haase, 224 B.R. at 678. The group dynamic in this transaction mirrors the traditional
four-party exchange.
171
Id.
172
Western Group Nurseries, Inc. v. Pomeranz, 867 P.2d 12 (Colo. App. 1993). The court
also analyzes the parties’ argument regarding collateral estoppel and fraud, which are not
directly relevant to the U.C.C. question. Id. at 15–16.
173
Id. at 13. The sale took place in two steps, including the purchase of the nursery stock and
assets by one company, for which a non-recourse note was given, and the sale of assets by the
first purchaser to a second company, which occurred almost simultaneously. Id. This second
transaction involved a wraparound note. Id.
174
Id.
175
Pomeranz, 867 P.2d at 14.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 15.
178
Id. at 15. (citing to Colorado’s version of article 9, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-9-102(2)
(1992 Repl. Vol. 2)).
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or performance of an obligation, the court held that “the transfer of a note for
security purposes is governed by Article 9.”179
Due to the fact that the security agreement for the second sale created a
security interest in the note given for that sale, and further due to the fact that
a court in a related case in a different jurisdiction ordered that that note be
sold at a foreclosure sale, the court held that the trial court’s application of
Article 9, rather than Article 3, was appropriate.180 The court in Pomeranz
did not expressly rule that the sale or assignment of a mortgage note creates a
security interest, in which Article 9 would apply to determinations of the
right to enforce the note. However, the reasoning in Pomeranz is similar to
that employed in Perez, discussed more fully, infra.181
2. New York: Provident Bank v. Community Home Mortgage Corp.
In Provident Bank v. Cmty Home Mortg. Corp.,182 the New York court
determined priority between banks that each received duplicate original notes
and assignments of mortgages. As discussed more fully, infra, applying both
Articles 3 and 9, the court found in favor of the same party via negotiation
and the law of secured transactions.183 The lower court case was decided at
summary judgment.184 Therefore, the court endeavored merely to determine
whether there was a genuine issue of material fact that precluded judgment
prior to trial.185
Defendant mortgage banker had originated residential mortgage loans
and obtained the money to fund the mortgages by entering into agreements
with banks, which operated as warehouses until a permanent investor
purchased the loans, to fund portions of the purchase prices of the loans.186
The banks alleged that defendant engaged in a scheme whereby its borrowers
would execute duplicate original promissory notes and mortgage
assignments.187 After the loans were sold to an investor, only one of the
banks that operated as a warehouse lender would be fully compensated.188 A
179

Id.
Id.
181
See Pomeranz, 867 P.2d at 13–16. In a separate, additional related case, the Eleventh
Circuit applied New York law and made its ruling under the rules of contract interpretation,
rather than seeking guidance from the U.C.C. See W. Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v. Ergas, 167 F.3d
1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999).
182
498 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
183
Id. at 575.
184
Id. at 563–64.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 561–62 (footnote omitted).
187
Id. at 562. The court in Provident Bank appears to refer to the original mortgage as a
“mortgage assignment,” because it is discussing the document signed by the borrowers, rather
than a document transferring the mortgage between entities with a lien or property interest
arising out of the mortgage. Id. (footnote omitted).
188
Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (citations omitted).
180
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dispute arose in Provident Bank as to which entity had priority in terms of
being paid for its purchase of the mortgage. One bank took possession of the
original notes and received and recorded assignments of mortgages; another
bank received the loans first in time, and the notes were specifically endorsed
to the first in time bank by defendant.189
The court used Article 9 to reason through the priority dispute.190
Initially, the court noted that it is clear that an assignment of mortgage
creates a security interest in the note secured by the mortgage.191 The court
explained that the lack of clarity regarding “which statutes govern
mortgages” in New York cause creditors to have difficulty in correctly
perfecting their security interests in mortgages.192 The court stated that the
recordation of the assignment of mortgage served as notice under New
York’s race-notice statute.193 New York follows the rule that “the mortgage
follows the note.”194 In application of this rule, the court questioned whether
Article 9 governs perfection of both the note and the mortgage.195 The court
explained that the unique characteristic of Provident Bank is that there is no
case law addressing adjudication over duplicate original notes and
mortgages.196
Predictably, the bank that recorded its assignments of mortgages first
argued that the race-notice statute should govern priority.197 The bank that
took possession of the endorsed notes first argued that Article 9 should
govern the court’s analysis.198 The court cited a number of cases wherein
Article 9 was applied in bankruptcy and to non-judicial foreclosure sales.199
189

Id. at 563. There was one exception to the first-in-time receipt, amongst a total of eight
notes. Seven of the notes were received by the bank that did not record assignments of the
mortgages prior to receipt of the duplicate documents by the other bank. Id.
190
Id. at 564–66.
191
Id. at 564 (citation omitted).
192
Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 564. Here, the court assumes that there is an Article 9
interest in the mortgage, which may be perfected, without providing authority demonstrating
this interest. Id.
193
Id. There are generally three types of statues which determine priority for interests in real
property: race, notice, and race-notice. Argent Mortg. Co., LLC v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 52
So.3d 796, 798–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). States may freely adopt the notice of their
choosing. Under a race statute, a subsequent mortgagee will prevail against a prior mortgagee
if the subsequent mortgage is recorded first. Under a notice statute, a subsequent mortgagee
who purchased for value and without notice of a prior mortgagee will prevail against the prior
mortgagee. Under a race-notice recording statute, a subsequent mortgagee who purchased for
value and without notice will prevail against the prior mortgagee, if and only if the subsequent
mortgage is recorded before the prior mortgage. Id.
194
Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 564–65 (citation omitted).
195
Id.
196
Id. at 565. The application of Article 9 in Provident Bank may be limited to cases in which
there is a dispute over duplicate notes and/or mortgages, but the court does not expressly state
whether there is such a limitation.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 569–70 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
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The court then held that “pursuant to Article 9, possession of the note
perfects the assignee’s security interest, under the principle that the mortgage
follows the note.”200
Following its discussion of Article 9, the court also applied Article 3.201
The court held that the notes were negotiated and sufficiently endorsed.202
Provident Bank does not discuss whether application of Article 9 to the
assignment of security interests conflicts with Article 3, thereby requiring an
application of one or the other, but not both.203 Further, Provident Bank does
not turn on the application of either Article 3 or Article 9 to determine
standing in an action to foreclose a non-duplicate mortgage.204 Ultimately,
Provident Bank underscores the difficulty in determining which portions of
the U.C.C. apply in a particular set of facts.
3. Arizona/Illinois: In re Veal
In In re Veal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 9th Circuit applied
Illinois state law to questions regarding parties’ standing, in regards to a
choice of law provision in a relevant mortgage contract.205 A bank, acting as
trustee for a loan trust, obtained relief from the automatic stay under the
bankruptcy code, relating to debtors’ property.206 Additionally, an objection
to debtors’ proof of claim was overruled, in favor of a mortgage loan
servicer.207 The debtors appealed the relief from the stay and the overruling
of the objection in a consolidated appeal.208 The issues before the court were
whether the bank had standing to seek relief from the automatic stay and
whether the servicer had standing to file the proof of claim.209
The note was specifically endorsed.210 There was also an assignment of
mortgage.211 Further, there was an assignment of the note, which the court
held to be superfluous in light of the specific endorsement.212 The court
reasoned that it was necessary to determine whether the bank or the servicer
200

Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 570. This statement is curious, because the court does
not require the Article 9 methods of attachment and perfection, but instead uses Article 9 as a
stand-in for the analysis under Article 3. See id. at 571 (citations omitted).
201
Id. at 572. The reasoning applies to a party who claims the status of a holder in due course,
which the subject bank claimed. Id.
202
Id. at 573.
203
See generally Id. (avoiding a discussion of whether application of Article 9 conflicts with
Article 3).
204
Provident Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 574–75.
205
In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 916 n.32 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).
206
Id. at 902.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 903.
211
In re Veal, 450 B.R. at 903.
212
Id. at 904 n.6.
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had standing, generally, and also whether they had prudential standing, to be
able to access the federal courts.213
The court noted that the U.C.C. embraces instances in which the person
who owns the note is not the person entitled to enforce the obligation to pay
thereunder.214 This fact lends credence to the notion that “the rules that
determine who is entitled to enforce a note are concerned primarily with the
maker of the note” and who they must pay to avoid default—as opposed to
the rules concerning transfer of ownership and other interests in the note,
which are concerned with who, “among competing claimants,” is entitled to
the value of the note.215 This distinction is important for the court, because it
allows the court to distinguish Article 9 ownership rights in the note from the
Article 3 right to enforce the note, with the attendant right to foreclose the
mortgage.216 However, the court notes that, if a payee seeks to use the note
as collateral or sell the note to a third party “in a manner not within Article
3,” Article 9 would govern the transaction and determine whether a property
interest in the note is obtained.217 Ultimately, the court holds that the parties
seeking the value of the note could prove entitlement to same by
demonstrating that they were a person entitled to enforce the note under
Article 3, but that one party could also alternatively demonstrate that it had
some ownership or other property interest in the note.218
4. Florida
a. GE Credit Corp. v. Air Flow Indus.
GE Credit Corp. v. Air Flow Indus., Inc. involved the aftermath of a
foreclosure action relating to a mortgage given for the construction of a
pool.219 The foreclosure was based on an ineffective mortgage, which
described a parcel of land that did not exist.220 Thereafter, plaintiff brought
an action against the company that had assigned the mortgage to plaintiff, as
well as the company’s principals who had individually guaranteed the
mortgage.221
The Florida court considered whether the U.C.C. governs “the legal
consequences of the assignment of a real estate mortgage,” and concluded
213

Id. at 906. Prudential standing is not a relevant fact in determining whether a party may
enforce a note or foreclose a mortgage in a typical foreclosure matter. Id. at 907 (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted).
214
Id. at 912 (footnote omitted).
215
Id.
216
In re Veal, 450 B.R. at 912.
217
Id. at 913 (footnote omitted).
218
Id. at 912 (footnotes omitted).
219
GE Credit Corp. v. Air Flow Indus., Inc., 432 So. 2d 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1983).
220
Id. at 608. The court calls the mortgage an “ineffective instrument,” though it is likely that
the note was the instrument, rather than the mortgage.
221
Id.
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that it did not.222 The court found that Articles 2, 3, and 9 were each
inapplicable to the assignment.223 With regard to its analysis under Article 3,
the court cites a single section of the Florida Statutes, which no longer
exists.224 However, the application of Article 3 to the legal consequences of
an assignment of mortgage is irrelevant, because Article 3 nevertheless
covers negotiable instruments, such as the note that provides the underlying
debt that the assigned mortgage would secure.225
The court’s holding regarding Article 9 is most significant. For support,
the court cites to Rucker v. State Exchange Bank,226 which held that “the
assignment of a real estate mortgage securing a promissory note as collateral
for a bank loan is not a secured transaction under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code because it is specifically excluded by Section
679.104(10).”227 However, as will be discussed, infra, the applicability of
this holding in Rucker has been undercut by subsequent legislation, which is
potentially only material to the question of whether recordation of an
assignment of mortgage is necessary.228
b. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez
In HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, two banks took possession of similar
mortgage promissory notes, which were both secured by the same mortgage,
and each disputed that the other did not have the right to foreclose the single
mortgage.229 The Florida circuit court applied portions of Chapter 701,
Florida Statutes, which governs the assignment and cancellation of
mortgages.230 The appellate court concluded that “the Uniform Commercial
Code, and not the recording statute, controls this case.”231 However, the
court did not look to Chapter 673 of the Florida Statutes, which governs
negotiability. Instead, the court reasoned that “[u]nder the Code, the bank

222

Id. at n.5.
Id.
224
See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 673.104 (1981)).
225
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041 (West 1994).
226
355 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
227
Id. at 175. The court in Perez, infra, analyzes this language in Rucker and explains that
Chapter 679 was reformed to clear up any misconceptions and provide that an assignment of a
security interest is a secured transaction, for the purpose of not requiring the cost of
recordation of assignments of mortgage. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Perez, 165 So. 3d 696,
707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
228
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 707.
229
Id. at 698.
230
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 701.
231
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698. The recording statute referenced is FLA. STAT. ANN. § 701.02,
which governs the recordation of assignments of mortgages. Florida has a separate recording
statute, generally, at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 695.01.
223
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that first perfected its interest in a note and related mortgage is entitled to the
priority of its interest.”232
Florida’s enactment of Article 9 is contained in Chapter 679 of the
Florida Statutes.233 The court in Perez noted that “[g]enerally, Chapter 679
does not apply ‘to the creation of’ a real property mortgage.’”234 However,
this concession was meant to set up an exception that may apply to most, if
not all, of foreclosure cases in the state. The court goes on to state “if . . . the
note in a mortgage transaction is sold or assigned, Chapter 679 applies to the
security interest created in favor of the purchaser or assignee of the note.”235
This exception is expansive because, as discussed, supra, most mortgage
promissory notes are sold or assigned, at some point.
The court cites the following Official Comment in support of its
reasoning:
O borrows $10,000 from M and secures its repayment
obligation, evidenced by a promissory note, by granting to M
a mortgage on O’s land. [Article 9] does not apply to the
creation of the real-property mortgage. However, if M sells
the promissory note to X or gives a security interest in the
note to secure M’s own obligation to X, [Article 9] applies to
the security interest thereby created in favor of X. The
security interest in the promissory note is covered by [Article
9] even though the note is secured by a real-property
mortgage.236
232

Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698.
Id. at 699.
234
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091).
235
Id. The opinion in Perez, to the extent that it appears to provide space for standing to be
established under Article 9 precepts, appears to conflict with recently-enacted Florida law,
which requires complaints to plead standing to foreclose pursuant to Article 3. Specifically,
section 702.015, Florida Statutes and rule 1.115, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, each
require a plaintiff in a foreclosure action to track the language of Article 3.
236
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091, cmt. 7). The court here neglects to reference the
following paragraph in the Comment, which states that “an attempt to obtain or perfect a
security interest in a secured obligation by complying with non-article 9 law, as by an
assignment of record of a real properly mortgage, would be ineffective,” though this section is
discussed elsewhere in the opinion to arrive at a determination that the mortgage assignment
recording statute is irrelevant to a determination under Article 9. See id. at 707–08. That said,
it is disputable whether the status of the parties needs to be determined by a resort to Article 9,
in the first place, and the court does not address this question. See id.; see also Am. Bank S. v.
Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reasoning, before the 1998
amendments to Article 9, that “the promissory note meets the requirements of section 673.104,
Florida Statutes (1991) and is thus a negotiable instrument” and determining priority based on
Florida’s statutory scheme adopting Article 3 of the Code). In fact, the court in Rothenberg
held that “the rights of the parties must be determined by the character of the promissory
note,” and not by the potential attachment or perfection of any interests in same. Rothenberg,
598 So. 2d at 291; see also Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. Haynes & Co., 893 F. Supp. 1304,
233

296 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 2

The mortgage in Perez was in favor of Federal Guaranty Mortgage
Company.237 HSBC obtained physical possession of one of the notes when it
closed on a pooling and servicing agreement.238 Subsequent to HSBC’s
purchase, the second bank entered into a separate pooling and servicing
agreement and took possession of the second note.239 The court held that,
“[o]nce HSBC took possession of the note it had an Article 9 security interest
in the note,” which attached.240 The perfecting of the security interest in the
note resulted in a perfection of the security interest in the mortgage, as
well.241
In an attempt to make the decision seem consistent with prior precedent
on the subject, the court reasoned that the facts in the dispute are consistent
with “the notion that the promissory note, not the mortgage, is the operative
instrument in a mortgage loan transaction, since a mortgage is but an incident
to the debt, the payment of which it secures, and its ownership follows the
assignment of the debt.”242
However, immediately following this
pronouncement of consistency, the court then discussed how a security
interest attaches to collateral,243 and restated a stricter requirement than that
for Article 3 negotiation: attachment occurs “when (a) value has been given,
(b) the assignor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in
the collateral to a secured party, and (c) the assignor has authenticated a
security agreement that provides a description of the collateral or the
assignee has taken possession of the note under section 679.3131.”244
passim (D.S.C. 1994) (applying Article 3 to a dispute between two defrauded, innocent
parties, and expressly rejecting application of Article 9).
237
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698.
238
Id. A pooling and servicing agreement relates to the securitization of mortgage loans and is
a typical document in transactions between lending institutions and mortgage servicers. These
agreements tend to be rigid mechanisms to govern “the management of securitized mortgage
loan pools.” Anna Gelpern and Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1077
(describing a pooling and servicing agreement as being designed to “preclude or severely
constrain the modification of both the securitization arrangement and the underlying
mortgages”).
239
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 698.
240
Id. at 699.
241
Id.
242
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court cites WM Specialty Mortg., LLC v. Salomon,
874 So. 2d 680, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which quotes Johns v. Gillian, 184 So. 140,
143 (Fla. 1938). Both Salomon and Gillian involve a set of facts in which a mortgage was
assigned. However, as discussed, supra, such an assignment would be insufficient under
Article 9.
243
Perez, 165 So. 2d at 699–700. Pursuant to Article 9, a party may not foreclose unless the
security interest has attached to the collateral. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-1, at 1185 (6th ed. 2010).
244
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 699–700 (internal. quotations omitted). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 679.2031; U.C.C. § 9-203. Note the difference between the requirement of value, the right
to transfer, and either a formal agreement with specific information or physical possession and

2015

NON-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

297

The Perez court discusses the idea of perfection of a security interest in
negotiable notes, as opposed to attachment of the security interest to the note,
by stating that “[o]ne method of perfecting a security interest in a promissory
note is by taking possession of the original promissory note.”245 It is argued
that perfection functions as public notice, because the collateral is not left in
the hands of the debtor.246 However, perfection is not required for the
prosecution of a foreclosure case.247
Following its discussion of the applicability of the doctrines of
attachment and perfection, the court reasoned that HSBC, and not the
subsequent possessor of the second note, had priority, as determined under
Article 9 and Florida’s legislation in furtherance thereof.248 The priority
determination is less pertinent to this discussion than is the fact that Article 9
was utilized to make the determination. The Perez court notes that, in a prior
case,249 the court concluded that the assignment of mortgage recording statute
had no application to a determination of priority, much like the court’s ruling
in Perez.250 Unlike in Perez, the court in the prior case “applied Chapter 673
of Florida’s Uniform Commercial Code to hold American Bank’s interest
superior to Rothenberg’s by virtue of its status as possessor of a valid
assignment of mortgage and holder in due course of the original note.”251
The court further cited a case which “held that ‘the assignment of a real
estate mortgage securing a promissory note as collateral for a bank loan is
not a secured transaction under Article 9’ of the UCC.”252 Although the case
had been supplanted by legislation meant to demonstrate that an assignment
the requirement that a person be in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either
to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession.
245
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 700 (citing FLA. STAT. § 679.3131(1) (2008)). Perfection determines
matters of priority and provides third parties with notice of the transaction. See id.
246
Id.; see also David A. Ebroon, Note, Perfection by Possession in Article 9: Challenging the
Arcane but Honored Rule, 69 IND. L.J. 1193, 1194 (1994).
247
See id. The court in Perez cites to the Report of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code, cited herein supra note 1. The Report distinguishes between an
enforcement interest in an instrument and its security interest on the one hand and an
entitlement to the economic value of the instrument or security interest, on the other hand. See
Report of the Editorial Board, supra note 1, at 339. There being two separate possible
interests: one of entitlement to enforce an instrument and another of entitlement to the
economic value of the instrument, application of Article 9 to sold or transferred mortgage
promissory notes is of no moment, because the rules therein apply only “among competing
claimants,” which is wholly within the world of the mortgagee. See id. In the world of the
mortgagor, questions of who the mortgagor is required to pay and who may enforce the loan
documents are resolved under Article 3. See id. at 345. However, this is not clarified in
Perez, and appears not to be recognized by other jurisdictions, as discussed, herein.
248
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 708.
249
Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
250
Perez, 165 So. 3d at 702–04.
251
Id. at 704 (internal quotations omitted).
252
Id. at 707 (quoting Rucker v. State Exchange Bank, 355 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978)).
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of a security interest in a mortgage is a secured transaction,253 the court does
not respond to the established precedent that the character of the note is what
matters, rather than the perfection of any interest in the note.254 It may be
that the Perez court intended for Article 9 to apply to disputes between
lenders, while leaving Article 3 for resolution of disputes between a lender
and borrowers, but this is not explicitly stated. It may also be that the court’s
reasoning means standing in a garden variety foreclosure case will be
decided by use of Article 9, if there was ever a sale or transfer of the loan.
V. THE PREFERENCE OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARTICLE 3 ENFORCEMENT OF MORTGAGE PROMISSORY NOTES TO
ENFORCEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 9
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, there are two avenues to
establish a lender’s standing to enforce a mortgage promissory note: a lender
may either travel under Article 3 or may attempt to travel under Article 9.255
Article 3 governs negotiable instruments, whereas Article 9 governs secured
transactions.256 Applied to the arena of foreclosures, Article 9 serves to
replicate many of the fundamental errors that arose during the fashioning of
foreclosure jurisprudence, including uncertainty in terminology, disharmony
amongst jurisdictions, and a tendency toward the harsh end of strict
foreclosure. Article 3, on the other hand, represents a solution to many of the
problems made manifest under Article 9.
A. Article 9: Definitional Uncertainty, Non-Uniformity, and a Trend
Toward Strict Foreclosure
Article 9 is divided into five main components: “scope, attachment,
perfection, priorities, and enforcement.”257 Scope and attachment are the
critical components for the purpose of this article; those components control
whether Article 9 applies in the context of an action to foreclose a mortgage
and whether Article 9 would be preferable to the traditional methodology
under Article 3.
The scope of Article 9 reaches a security interest arising under other
sections of the U.C.C.258 However, the security interests covered under
Article 9 on this point generally relate to interests arising under Articles 2, 4,
253

Id. (quoting FLA. S. JUSTICE APPROP. COMM., S.B. 370 (2005), Staff Analysis 7–8 (Apr. 4,
2005)).
254
Id.
255
See Report of the Editorial Board, supra note 1, at 333–34.
256
Id. at 333.
257
Keith G. Meyer, A Potpourri of Article 9 Issues, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 323, 323 (Summer
2003) (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-108, 9-109, 9-203, 9-204, 9-315(a) (2000)).
258
Id. at 324 n. 252 (citing U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(5)); see also U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(6).
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and 5, and do not include reference to any Article 3 interests.259 Article 9
also applies to promissory notes.260 The section defining scope does not
include mortgages.261 Article 9 has been applied to mortgage foreclosure
cases, where the property is used for the production of agricultural crops.262
Notwithstanding this application, there are specific portions of the U.C.C.
dedicated to security interests in crops,263 and agricultural interests under
Article 9 are governed specifically and directly.264
Sections 9-109(c) and (d) set for enumerated transactions that are exempt
from application of Article 9. One exemption is for an assignment of
“accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes which
[are] for the purpose of collection only.”265 Additionally, with exceptions,
the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property is exempt.266
Article 9 does not apply to a pure real estate transaction.267 However,
when Article 9 was revised in 2002, the definition of “account” was
broadened “to include the right to payment of a monetary obligation for
property that has been . . . sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise
disposed of.”268 Therefore, the obligation to make payments under an
installment contract for the sale of real property is an account, now.269
Article 9 applies to the sale of accounts.270
Initially, enforcement under Article 9 is vague and uncertain because
Article 9 relies on a theory of “commercial reasonableness,” which is flexible
in ways much like the “reasonable period” afforded under the equity of
redemption.271 Commercial reasonableness stands for the proposition that
parties are to act in good faith and conduct themselves with fair dealing in
coming to a determination as to reasonable value.272 There is no bright-line
test to determine whether a particular result is commercially reasonable, and
nor is there an articulated method for specifying the parameters of
259

U.C.C. §§ 9-109(a)(5), (6).
U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3).
261
See U.C.C. § 9-109(a).
262
Meyer, supra note 257, at 326.
263
Id.; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(44)(iv); 9-302, 9-308, 9-310, 9-317, 9-322, 9-338, 9-606.
264
See U.C.C. § 9-302, providing specifically for the jurisdictional parameters of perfection
and priority of agricultural liens; see also Moritz Implement Co. v. Matthews, 959 P.2d 886
(Kan. 1998), discussed by Meyer as holding “that Article 9 is the exclusive statutory scheme
governing security interests in growing crops” and that attachment of such liens is independent
of the occurrence of a foreclosure sale of the property. Meyer, supra note 257, at 326 n.14.
265
U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(5).
266
U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(11).
267
Meyer, supra note 257, at 327.
268
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (citing U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(i)).
269
Meyer, supra note 257, at 328.
270
U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3).
271
See Donald J. Rapson, Default and Enforcement of Security Interests under Revised Article
9, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 893, 893, 907 (1999).
272
See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20).
260
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commercial reasonableness.273 Moreover, commercial reasonability may
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, furthering confusion as to what is or
may be commercially reasonable in a particular set of circumstances.274
Contributing to the unpredictable air surrounding commercial reasonableness
under Article 9 is the fact that, while Article 9 provides the right to foreclose,
it never defines the word “foreclose.”275
Furthermore, Article 9 fails to promote sufficient uniformity in real
estate law.276 A secured party who exercises rights under Article 9, with
respect to personal property, is not prejudiced as to any rights under real
estate law.277 However, revised Article 9, as applied in a one-form-of-action
pleading state, may cause the secured party to lose the right to proceed
against personalty where such a secured party first engages in an action to
judicially enforce a mortgage.278
Perhaps most importantly, Article 9 provides for the harsh remedy of
strict foreclosure. Revised Article 9 encourages strict foreclosure in at least
five separate ways: (1) the secured party may elect to accept collateral in
satisfaction of a debt if the secured party does not receive an objection within
20 days; (2) in certain circumstances, the secured party may accept collateral
in partial satisfaction of a debt; (3) the secured party may strictly foreclose
intangible collateral; (4) the secured party may accept collateral and use such
acceptance as a discharge of junior claimants, without the junior claimants
having the equitable due process rights to seek surplus proceeds; and (5) the
secured party may hold collateral for an undefined, indefinite, uncertain
period of time and still seek a deficiency.279 The acerbity of Article 9 is only
furthered by the fact that, in conjunction with allowing a party to proceed by

273

John P. McCahey, Commercial Reasonableness in the Disposition of Collateral: Proceed
with Care, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL & BUSINESS LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (Summer 2002) (providing that “the particular facts and circumstances of each
disposition will determine whether or not it was commercially reasonable”).
274
Id. Compare the inscrutable, unwieldy process in Article 9 with revised Article 8. Article
8 was revised in a manner that represents “a bold and long overdue advance that facilitates the
day-to-day transfer and registration of securities in the country’s active securities markets.”
Richard A. Hakes, UCC Article 8: Will the Indirect Holding of Securities Survive the Light of
Day?, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 661, 664 (2002). The revisions to Article 8 had an intended goal
of simplifying, rather than complicating the rules concerning the purview of Article 8. See id.
at 671.
275
Rapson, supra note 271 at 907 (calling Article 9’s treatment of foreclosure “loose and
informal”); see also U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1).
276
U.C.C. § 9-604(a).
277
Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of the UCC: Scope, Perfection, Priorities, and Default, 4
N.C. BANKING INST. 129, 171–72 (2000). A state with one form of action is a state that
utilizes a single procedural vehicle for attempting to enforce or protect private rights.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 178–80; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-620, 9-621, 9-622.
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judicial process, it also permits a secured party to take possession of
collateral without judicial process.280
B. The Benefits of Enforcement under Article 3
In contrast to the problematic scheme contemplated in Article 9,281
Article 3, revised in 2002 and adopted by a number of states,282 avoids the
problems of the past. Negotiability under Article 3, as the traditional
enforcement mechanism for mortgage promissory notes, fosters
predictability and uniformity amongst jurisdictions.283 Article 3 requires
physical possession of the note, unless the note has been lost or destroyed.284
The physical possession requirement protects borrowers in the face of
potentially dishonest lenders.285 The protection provided by Article 3 is
balanced by the ability, under Section 3-309 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, to enforce an instrument not in possession of the lender where
ownership can be proven, even if the purchaser and the seller were never in
possession of the note.286
Under Article 3, proof of the ability to enforce an instrument is a
mandatory element that addresses concerns that borrowers would otherwise
be vulnerable to having to satisfy obligations more than once, because a
holder in due course could acquire possession of the note after a person not
in possession had already sought to enforce the note.287 Due to the fact that
most other states had already adopted the 2002 revisions to Article 3 by
2004, nationwide adoption and use of Revised Article 3 promotes further
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U.C.C. §§ 9-609(b)(1), (2). Presumably, the only limitation on the ability of a secured
party to take possession of collateral or remove, render useless, or dispose of collateral on a
debtor’s premises is that the secured party is required to do so “without breach of the peace.”
U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2).
281
In addition to the problems discussed, supra, resort to enforcement by way of Article 9
restricts the free flow of negotiable paper, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage servicing
industry has normalized negotiation as a means to transfer mortgage promissory notes. Such a
move should be rejected in favor of the free circulation of promissory notes. See Jack J.
Fisher, The Effect of Fluctuating Rates of Interest on the Negotiability of an Instrument, 23
WASH. U.L.Q. 385, 391–92, 398 (1938).
282
Natalya Ter-Grigoryan, Improving the Law of Negotiable Instruments: Support for
Arizona’s Adoption of the 2002 Proposed Revisions to Uniform Commercial Code Section 3309, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1331, passim (Winter 2010/2011).
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White, supra note 3, at 472–73 (stating that Article 3 is utilized as the traditional, assumed
approach for enforcement, while parties and courts are presently simultaneously opposing the
injection of Article 9 enforcement); see also Nyquist, supra note 57, at 898–99.
284
U.C.C. §§ 3-201, 3-309.
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Ter-Grigoryan, supra note 282, at 1334–35.
286
U.C.C. § 3-309; see also Ter-Grigoryan, supra note 282, at 1345 (discussing Florida’s
adoption of the 2002 revisions to Section 3-309).
287
SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECON. IMPACT STATEMENT, S.B. 282 (Fla. 2004),
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uniformity.288 Likewise, Revised Article 3 allows for electronic maintenance
of real estate finance documents, making it easier for parties to trace the
chain of a promissory note.289 Enforcement under Article 3 therefore
protects consumers, guards against secret liens, and encourages transactions
to function through an open, increasingly transparent, and ordinary course.290
The question, then, is whether mortgage notes are negotiable, and thus
entitled to Article 3 enforcement.
Resorting to enforcement by way of Article 9 restricts the free flow of
negotiable paper, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage servicing
industry has normalized negotiation as a means to transfer mortgage
promissory notes. Such a move should be rejected in favor of the free
circulation of promissory notes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The historical developments of negotiability and foreclosure law, along
with the present foreclosure backlog, point toward the fact that negotiability
provides a predictable framework in an otherwise chaotic mess. A mortgage
promissory note is a negotiable instrument, which entitles a plaintiff lender to
claim status as the holder of the negotiable instrument. As the holder of the
negotiable instrument, the plaintiff lender gains the incidental right to enforce
any mortgage related to the note. This formula is nearly universal and has
existed since before the Great Depression ushered forth the last foreclosure
backlog. Recent attempts to privilege Article 9 over Article 3 will not result
in better outcomes in foreclosure cases, but will instead replicate the errors
seen throughout the history of the law relating to foreclosure.
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